With 800,000 units in stock, the millet store owner is struggling to hold on

The boom that became a glut

A niche retail boom built on blind‑box "gacha" merchandise has turned sour, and small shop owners are paying the price. It has been reported that one operator — described in local coverage as a typical "gacha shop" owner — is sitting on some 800,000 unsold units. Gacha shops (谷店) sold cheaply produced but highly collectible blind‑box items to a young, fandom‑driven customer base; at their peak they looked like an easy, low‑barrier route to quick profits, helped by runaway hits from large players such as Pop Mart (泡泡玛特) and lifestyle chains like Miniso (名创优品).

The business model depended on novelty, scarcity and the emotional boost of immediate gratification. That model also carried fragility: most customers were students with limited budgets, purchases spiked around school holidays and resold or pooled buying on second‑hand platforms undercut in‑store sales. It has been reported that in 2025 new gacha store openings were outpaced by closures by a ratio of 1:2, and roughly 14% of new stores failed within a year — signs that the "gacha economy" is shifting from expansion to painful consolidation.

Why margins are collapsing

Margins eroded from several directions at once. Popular IPs draw high wholesale prices, and smaller stores often have no bargaining power; reported supplier bundling deals force stores to take slow‑moving titles in order to access hot stock. When an IP is hot, secondary‑market frenzy inflates resale prices — but supply catches up fast and prices can crash, leaving retailers stuck with inventory bought at peak prices. Meanwhile, cheap domestic knock‑offs and direct online group buys allow dedicated fans to circumvent brick‑and‑mortar margins entirely.

Big retail chains and established toy brands, as well as IP owners themselves, have started to occupy the space once dominated by independent stores. That competitive pressure, plus the high cost of orchestrating licensed events (reportedly hundreds of thousands of yuan), puts experiential marketing out of reach for most single‑site operators. Some have tried diversification — consignment models, complementary craft or stationery lines, or curated higher‑price items — and a few multi‑store operators have stabilized revenue. For many, however, the only options are heavy discounting, liquidation or closure.

What comes next?

The gacha market is unlikely to disappear: emotional fandom and collectible culture still have consumers. But the era of easy storefront wins is over. Expect consolidation around stronger chains, IP integrators and better‑capitalized operators, while smaller owners either professionalize quickly or exit. The question now is stark: can the gacha ecosystem retain the grassroots diversity that built its fandom, or will it be reshaped into a top‑heavy market where scarcity is manufactured by a few dominant players?