Nexperia saga spotlights Europe’s shrinking clout in the US–China chip showdown

A forced sell-off that reverberates beyond the UK

The drawn-out fate of Nexperia, the Dutch chipmaker owned by China’s Wingtech Technology (闻泰科技), has become a litmus test for Europe’s leverage in the US–China tech war. After Nexperia acquired the UK’s Newport Wafer Fab in 2021, London ordered a divestment on national-security grounds in late 2022 under its new investment-screening regime; Nexperia’s legal challenge has since been dismissed, leaving the sell-down in place. The message is clear: Europe can block deals—but can it set the rules of the game?

Fragmented defenses, limited leverage

The Nexperia episode aligns with a pattern. Berlin blocked the sale of Elmos Semiconductor’s fab to Sweden’s Silex, ultimately controlled by China’s Sai Microelectronics (赛微电子). The Netherlands, under US pressure, tightened exports of advanced lithography tools by ASML—Europe’s crown jewel in chipmaking equipment—curbing shipments to China. These steps show resolve, but also dependence on Washington’s playbook as the US extends export controls beyond cutting-edge logic to, reportedly, legacy chips vital to autos and industrial gear. Europe, outside of ASML and niche materials, exerts little end-to-end supply-chain sway.

Industrial ambition meets geopolitical gravity

Europe’s auto-heavy economy runs on the “mature” semiconductors that Nexperia specializes in, making disruptions politically sensitive. The EU Chips Act aims to double the bloc’s global manufacturing share to 20% by 2030 and is luring projects such as TSMC’s planned Dresden fab. Yet funding is fragmented, state-aid rules are stretched, and most advanced capacity remains in Asia or the US. Can Europe protect national security, keep factories supplied, and still attract Chinese-linked capital when ownership is politically toxic?

The new fault line: legacy chips

Beijing has warned against “politicizing” supply chains, and Wingtech has decried the UK order. Any broader US-led curbs on legacy-chip trade would ripple through Europe’s carmakers, who rely on Chinese foundries such as SMIC (中芯国际) for volume at older nodes. That is the crux exposed by Nexperia: Europe can veto deals at home, but in a bifurcating market shaped by US policy and Chinese scale, its influence over where—and under whose rules—critical chips are made appears to be waning.