“Expectation bubble” around U.S. leadership is bursting — what should China (中国) and Russia do next?

The claim and the scene

A recent Beijing Dialogue (北京对话) conversation between co‑founder Han Hua (韩桦) and Timofei Bordachev — a professor at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) and director of the Valdai Debate Club program — framed the U.S. handling of the Israel‑Iran crisis as a moment when the “expectation bubble” that many countries have placed around American global leadership is deflating. The backdrop is clear to Western readers: a sustained U.S.–Israel‑Iran confrontation, renewed volatility in the Gulf and energy markets, and parallel high‑stakes bilateral diplomacy — for example, China‑U.S. economic teams reportedly continued negotiations even as the crisis unfolded in the Middle East.

Bordachev’s diagnosis: alliances are transactional, interests are sovereign

Bordachev argued that contemporary alliances are increasingly transactional and that nuclear powers — Russia, the United States and China — do not depend on traditional alliance networks for survival. He warned that states should stop assuming the United States will act as a global “guardian” of others’ interests; instead, governments will prioritize core national interests and behave accordingly. It has been reported that some analysts now fear higher oil prices could tip global markets toward recession — one concrete consequence Bordachev highlighted of miscalculated military moves in the Gulf.

What this means for China (中国) and Russia

For Beijing and Moscow, the prescription is twofold: first, shore up domestic sources of strength — economic resilience, energy security, and regional stability — because power “originates from within,” as Bordachev put it. Second, make bilateral great‑power relations — China‑U.S., Russia‑U.S., China‑Russia — more predictable, because predictability at that level contains risks even if a fully stable global order is unattainable. Sanctions, trade policy and regional crises will continue to shape options: Russia still operates under heavy Western sanctions, and China must weigh trade ties and supply‑chain exposure when deciding how far to push in distant theaters.

A more transactional, multipolar era?

The broader implication is a shift toward a more transactional, interest‑driven international order in which expectations of American global policing are unreliable. Will that produce clearer spheres of influence, or more chaotic competition over peripheral theaters? Bordachev and Han both suggest preparing for differentiated priorities and sober calculations, not surprise moral rescues — a hard lesson for states that have long relied on Washington’s standing abroad.