Lianhe Zaobao podcast: Wang Jiangyu says Trump is in a difficult position — how will the attack on Iran end?

Washington stuck between narrative and reality

On Lianhe Zaobao (联合早报)'s podcast "Dong Tan Xi Lun", Wang Jiangyu (王江雨), professor and director of the Centre for Chinese and Comparative Law at City University of Hong Kong (香港城市大学), argued that the United States is "riding a tiger" in its campaign against Iran. Short on viable options, Washington can either loudly declare victory and withdraw or settle into a low‑intensity, long‑running attritional conflict. It has been reported that U.S. media also revealed a 15‑point ceasefire proposal offered to Tehran; Tehran has reportedly rejected the framework and continued military reprisals.

Domestic politics, allies and the limits of force

Wang said domestic political constraints and waning ally support sharply limit U.S. choices. Could Washington realistically invade and topple Iran? No, he said — sending large ground forces would be "political suicide" in an American domestic scene already polarized ahead of midterms. Allies have refused to escort shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, he added, a practical indicator of eroding U.S. leadership and credibility. It has been reported that President Trump postponed a planned China visit amid the crisis, highlighting how sanctions, trade ties and broader U.S.–China competition are being affected.

Iran's asymmetric leverage

Tehran has exploited geography and asymmetric tactics to blunt superior U.S. firepower. Wang noted that selective closures of the Strait of Hormuz — and threatened strikes on regional oil infrastructure — function as near‑nuclear strategic levers by threatening global energy flows. It has been reported that Iran has deployed longer‑range missiles in recent strikes; oil prices flirting with $100 a barrel reflect the economic consequence. If the strait remains effectively contested, Japan, Korea and Europe would feel severe supply shocks, forcing them into strategic hedging that could reshape U.S.–China–EU balances.

Two plausible endgames

Wang sketches two plausible trajectories: a rapid narrative‑driven exit in which Washington proclaims battlefield gains and withdraws, or a drawn‑out low‑intensity conflict where periodic strikes and counterstrikes continue without decisive change. Which is likelier? He suggests the latter — unless domestic politics force an early exit. For Western readers unfamiliar with the region, the lesson is clear: conventional military superiority does not guarantee political outcomes. Reportedly, the crisis may therefore have longer, indirect effects on sanctions regimes, trade relations and global realignment long after the guns fall silent.