Starting a War Is Easy; Ending It Is Hard

Background: a resilient theocracy

The key angle is blunt: pressure intended to topple Tehran may instead have hardened it. Iran’s political system centers on the Supreme Leader and a layered set of institutions that fuse clerical authority with state power. It has been reported that the Assembly of Experts (88 seats) is directly elected but candidates are vetted by the Guardian Council; that council’s 12 members are themselves chosen through a mix of clerical appointment and judicial nomination — creating a system in which formal elections exist, but the pool of viable leaders is tightly managed. Short sentence. Who really leads? The answer is institutional, not purely personal.

It has been reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) functions as an independent economic and military pillar, with business interests across construction, energy and finance that Western analysts estimate could account for 20–40% of Iran’s GDP. That economic base, paired with institutional loyalty rather than simple personal fealty, helps explain why external pressure and sanctions have often produced adaptation rather than collapse. Over the last decade Iran has developed informal circuits — land routes for food and medicine, alternative trade partners, and domestic substitution — that blunt the immediate bite of sanctions.

What’s at stake: the Strait of Hormuz and geopolitical backlash

The immediate flashpoint is maritime commerce. It has been reported that global insurers such as Lloyd’s have been wary of underwriting ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz since the recent escalation; without insurance, few commercial operators will risk passage. If Tehran were to convert its current rhetoric about selective passage into a durable, institutionalized system — one that could identify vessels, coordinate willing insurers and set differential pricing — the global oil market could splinter into blocs and Iran could partially offset sanctions with new revenue streams. Would Washington tolerate such a structural shift? Short sentence. Maybe not.

Policy choices matter. The Trump administration’s approach — reportedly sweeping measures that at times targeted reformist figures as well as hardliners — may have narrowed Iran’s political center, producing a rally-around-the-flag effect and shrinking the space for negotiation. Ending a standoff will require trust and credible guarantees on both sides, yet mutual mistrust runs deep. Escalation risks more than a short military flare-up: strategic choke points, regional infrastructure and data centers, and the international insurance market are all vulnerability nodes. Starting a war was easy; finding an exit strategy that prevents an extended, disruptive stalemate will be far harder.