A lead from inside the system: can China curb overtime by making state bodies set the example?

Officials, academics and bosses are suddenly speaking the same language

At this year’s Two Sessions (全国“两会”), calls to curb “involution” and excessive overtime came from unlikely quarters. It has been reported that Lu Ming (陆铭), a special-term professor at Antai College, Shanghai Jiao Tong University (上海交通大学安泰经济管理学院), urged stepped-up enforcement of China’s labour rules and a phased alignment with EU practices on work hours and overtime pay. Gree Electric Appliances (格力电器) chair Dong Mingzhu (董明珠) has also publicly said that “struggle does not equal overtime,” signalling a shift in elite rhetoric. Who will set the tone in practice? State bodies and state-owned enterprises, Lu argues, could — and should — lead.

The gap between rules and reality

The law is old but clear: China’s Labour Law (1994) caps daily work at eight hours and a 44‑hour weekly average. Yet the National Bureau of Statistics reportedly said in January 2026 that average weekly hours for employed people in 2025 reached 48.6 hours. Surveys and tragic headlines back up the numbers: a recruitment-platform study found nearly 39% of workers say they almost always work overtime, and it has been reported that several high-profile cases of sudden death after long shifts have shocked public opinion. Enforcement is a persistent problem — it has been reported that one family waited more than a year for a first‑instance judgment after suing for “karoshi”-style compensation, and courts have tended to award sums that critics call insufficient given the human cost and legal delays.

Structural pressures — not just culture

This is not merely a cultural quarrel about “996” and workplace norms. China’s economic model — historically growth through production and close competition on output — makes longer hours a cheap lever to sustain margins. That dynamic is amplified by trade frictions and technology restrictions from the West that push sectors toward catch‑up and self‑reliance, increasing pressure on manufacturers and engineers. Beijing’s recent pivot to boost consumption and its anti‑involution rhetoric are intended to change incentives, but policy nudges work slowly. Some sectors and clusters have already taken steps — shortening supplier payment terms, voluntary production cuts in solar glass — yet the change remains uneven.

Enforcement, exemplars, and the politics of reform

If anything can shift norms at scale, it is demonstration from institutions with clout. Lu’s proposal to have government departments and central SOEs model compliance is pragmatic: the two‑day weekend itself first became standard through state units. Strengthening labour inspection, raising the cost of violations and shortening legal timelines would also matter. Reportedly, reformers in Beijing are moving in that direction, but implementation will test how much political will exists against entrenched market incentives. For workers and Western observers alike, the question is simple: can rules be turned into routine practice, or will overtime remain the default lever of an economy still racing to catch up?