Saren Mountain: The Debate Over Whether India or China Is the Leader of the Global South Is Itself a Mistake

The argument

Saren Mountain (萨仁山), a veteran Indian diplomat who has taken part in India–China strategic dialogues, told Chinese media that framing a contest over who leads the Global South — India or China — is the wrong question. He said New Delhi sees itself as a strategic autonomous power, not a client of any great power, and that the real task is cooperation between the two largest developing countries to reform global governance. Why argue over symbolic leadership when practical cooperation could reshape climate, trade and development rules?

Historical context

Mountain walked through seven decades of Sino‑Indian relations to make the point. He noted a warm early post‑1949 start, a rupture after the 1959 Tibet disturbances and the 1962 border war, then a slow normalization from the 1970s onward culminating in 2005 political guidance on the border and a declaration of strategic partnership. He also highlighted concrete cooperation: India is reportedly the second largest shareholder in both the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank, institutions New Delhi and Beijing helped design — proof, he argues, that partnership is possible even amid friction such as the 2020 border clashes.

Geopolitical tensions and the BRI

Mountain rejected the easy explanation that India’s closer ties with the United States or security arrangements in the Indo‑Pacific are simply tools to “contain” China. He said India partners where interests align — development, technology, investment — and retains independent judgment when they do not. It has been reported that some analysts linked recent warming with trade disputes such as U.S. tariffs; Mountain pointed out that India itself was a target of U.S. trade measures, which complicates any neat ally‑vassal narrative. He also reiterated why India did not join China’s Belt and Road Initiative: the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor traverses territory India claims, and, unlike the AIIB or NDB, the BRI lacked prior India–China consultation on structure and governance.

The road ahead

Mountain’s core message: avoid binary leadership contests and focus on mutual problem‑solving. For New Delhi, resolving the outstanding boundary issues is a precondition for deeper strategic cooperation that could benefit the wider developing world. Can India and China move from rivalry to partnership without settling all disputes first? Mountain’s hope is that recent meetings — including leaders’ exchanges in Kazan and Tianjin — mark the start of a slow, durable normalization rather than a short tactical respite.